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HON. WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT,
OF CONNECTICUT.
Our last meeting was held on foreign soil at Montreal.
Everyone who attended, I am sure, felt that it was a marked
success. Montreal is a great and beautiful city, which has a
peculiar character, due to its two peoples of French and English
origin that are united in a common citizenship. All felt that
the spirit shown by our Association in making Montreal its meet-
ing place, and the courteous and enthusiastic hospitality which
was the response of the Canadian Bar, strengthened the bond
between the two countries and made us nearer neighbors. There
was then nothing in the world's horizon to trouble the friends of
international peace. The beautiful address of Lord Chancellor
Haldane, in which he dwelt upon the effect of what he called
" Sittlichkeit," or " Good form," between groups of nations as
a growing influence in favor of peace, seemed to be quite in accord
with the conditions that then prevailed. Little did anyone think,
in listening to his words, and in approving without reserve their
sweet reasonableness and encouraging tone, that when next we
met, practically all Europe would be at war, fighting battles with
lines hundreds of miles in extent, with millions of men on one
side contending with millions of men on the other; that European
industry and commerce would be struck down, and that each
half of the European world would be rejoicing at the enormous
losses, reaching to hundreds of thousands, of the other half.
Such a human catastrophe, such a cataclysm in history beggars
a vocabulary in adequate description and throws gloom over the
entire world. It makes the peaceful administration of justice,
and a discussion of plans for its improvement, prosaic and unin-
teresting. While we stand aghast at this awful welter of blood,
destructive of the happiness of Europe, we are profoundly grate-
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ful for our splendid isolation and the freedom from entangling
alliances which Washington enjoined upon the American people.
This saves us from sharing in the suffering and sorrow of the
belligerents, but it does not save us from burden. In the
Napoleonic campaigns, which alone approximate in their all-
embracing character the present conflict, our ancestors were so
far removed from Europe, and were so independent in their
living and business, that they were not then affected as we are
now. The war has brought home to us, as nothing else could,
the closer union between the nations and the interdependence in
business and finance which we have reached in the progress of a
century. The overwhelming importance to us of keeping out of
the struggle has led President Wilson to warn the American
people, in their public expressions and actions, to maintain, as far
as possible, an impartial attitude, and in this appeal he should
have the warmest approval and the sincerest co-operation of all
of us.
Most of us do not understand how much significance European
peoples give to hostile expressions of our press and of prominent
men, which they are quite inclined to regard as either inspired
or at least acquiesced in by our government and as embodying the
views of the entire people. They do not appreciate the compara-
tively little weight in judging our national attitude that ought
to be given to editorial expressions, or hastily prepared corn-
imunications, based on current reports necessarily inaccurate or
biased. The language of the President, in which he declined to
be drawn into a decision or the expression of an opinion on the
complaints of belligerents, was most admirable and showed to
the world what we must show, that we do not intend to be drawn
into this controversy in any way; that while we are willing to.
assist as much as possible in bringing about peace, our attitude
as judges cannot be invoked until we are given formal authority,
with a stipulated condition to abide the judgment.
We are the principal nation of the Christian world not so re-
lated to the struggle that both sides may really regard us as
disinterested friends. It is our highest duty, and the President
makes plain his earnest appreciation of this, not to sacrifice and
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destroy this great leverage for successful mediation when the
opportunity arises, by ill-advised and premature judgment upon
the merits. The sensitiveness of the struggling participants to
every view friendly or hostile is most acute. Many of us can
remember how we felt when similarly placed. We must hold our
tongues to be useful to mankind.
Meantime, in the sound of battle, peace treaties are being made
between us and many other countries including some of the
belligerents, by which we agree to a period of one year as a locuts
pcenitentiw before a declaration of war. This does not seem a
large step, but it is something and might prove to be valuable
under circumstances that one can imagine. The present war,
however, has been used by the opponents of arbitration to prove
that treaties are of no avail and that if a nation wishes to go to
war no treaty will prevent it. No one who has advocated treaties
of arbitration as a means of avoiding armed conflict has ever con-
tended that they are an absolute insurance against war. Nobody
has contended that treaties are not broken. Is it a reason that
some are broken that we should give up making them? Is it a
reason for thinking that treaties of arbitration furnish no means
of settling international difficulties that there are instances where
they have failed ?
One of the few hopeful things about the present war is the ap-
peal that each side makes to the public of the United States, as the
most important part of the world left out of the fight, to justify
its course in going to war. The belligerents are thus showing
deference to international good form, to the " Sittlichkeit" of
Lord Haldane. It is, of course, too early to prophesy what the
result of this war may be. It is not too early to hope that the
exhaustion which it is certain to bring to both sides may sink
deep into the minds of their respective peoples the absurdity of
maintaining hereafter the policy of immense and bankrupting
armaments and the wisdom of a reduction in these by agreement,
so that in assuming the burdens that are sure to follow this
destructive visitation, they may not have to add to the cost of
recuperation billions for additional defense.
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And now that we are discussing compliance with treaties and
the effect of treaties of arbitration and of peace upon the chances
of war, is it not a good time for us to clean our own house and
put ourselves in a position where we can fulfill to the letter
every treaty that we have entered into? We have made many
treaties of friendship and peace-indeed treaties with all the
world-in which we have assured to aliens, subjects, or citizens
of the other party to the treaty resident within our borders due
process of law in protection of life, liberty, and pioperty. Never-
theless, we now withhold from the same authority that makes
the treaty the power to fulfill its obligation. A statute of a dozen
lines would put it in the power of the President to institute judi-
cial proceedings, civil and criminal, in courts of the United States,
to punish a violation of the treaty rights of aliens and enable him
to use the civil and military executive arm of the government to
protect against their threatened invasion. In our past experience
we must realize that mob violence committed through race preju-
dice against aliens will never be punished by state authority,
and there is nothing that a high-strung people-and it is peoples
now who largely control the matter of war and peace-resent
so much as the mistreatment of their fellow-countrymen living
under the flag of a foreign government which has stipulated and
pledged its honor to give them protection. The real opposition to
this reform finds its source in the factional determination of
people in localities to exclude lawful immigrants. They look to
illegal force to maintain their purpose, and they fear the effec-
tiveness of the national arm in restraining it.
It is idle to urge that the granting of such a power to the
Executive is contrary to the Constitution, because the Supreme
Court has already said specifically that Congress has the author-
ity. It is true that a majority of a committee of this Asso-
ciation 20 years ago reported that the existence of this power
was doubtful, but I venture to think that no committee could be
appointed to-day from the Association that would make such a re-
port. I hope that this question will be referred at this annual
meeting to the proper committee for another consideration of it,
a report as to the needed legislation, and a vote by the Association
in favor of its enactment.
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The most noteworthy national legislation of the year, from the
standpoint of the administration of justice, is contained in the
Trade Commission Act and the so-called Clayton Act. Together
they affect two general subjects matter. They supplement ex-
isting statutes and general law as to illegal trusts and monopolies
in interstate commerce, and they deal with the application of the
anti-trust act to labor associations, the issuing of injunctions in
labor disputes in federal courts, and the procedure for the punish-
nient of contempts in a certain class of cases.
Both measures in the most painstaking way make clear that
nothing in them is to vary the meaning of the three important
sections of the Sherman Act which have been so fully considered
and clearly construed by the Supreme Court in the light of, and by
the rule of, reason. We may, therefore, in beginning the consider-
ation of this new legislation, rejoice that in spite of the exuberant
criticism of the Supreme Court decisions in the Standard Oil and
Tobacco cases when announced, and the threats of legislation to
dethrone reason in judicial construction as applied to the anti-
trust laws, we may still use in a normal way those mental proc-
esses with which nature has endowed us in attempting to find
out what Congress means in these new acts.
The first part of this legislation adds new and elaborate ma-
chinery for the enforcement of the anti-trust acts. Second, it
appears to create new offenses in that field of the law. Third, it
imposes, after two years, certain restrictions upon what have
been called interlocking directorates in banks and railroads,
evidently with a view to prevent temptation to, and opportunity
for, a suppression of competition and monopoly. Fourth, it
brings into the federal criminal jurisdiction embezzlements and
other breaches of trust by directors, officers, and agents of inter-
state carriers, and provides other restrictions to secure their
fidelity.
An analogy more or less complete is established between the
regulation of common carriers under the interstate commerce
law and that of industrial concerns engaged in interstate trade.
As the commerce law declares undue discrimination and un-
reasonable rates unlawful, so this trade law declares "unfair
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methods of competition" unlawful. As the former creates a com-
mission to determine what rates are unduly discriminating or un-
reasonable, so the latter creates one to determine what are unfair
methods of competition. Similar process and hearings are pro-
vided in case of probable violations of the law upon the complaint
of anyone, or of the commission's own motion. Equally inquisi-
torial powers are conferred on the two commissions. The Trade
Commission is to find the facts after any hearing; and, if suffi-
cient, make an order against the defendant, to be enforced in case
of refusal by application to the Court of Appeals of the proper
circuit. The court is to take the finding of fact as conclusive.
if based on any evidence, to decide the questions of'law, and re-
verse, modify, or affirm the order; and, if sustaining it in any
part, to enforce it. The commission is to act as Master in
Chancery in assisting the court in formulating orders and de-
crees for the proper adjustment of the affairs of a corporation
found guilty of violating the anti-trust law, and, in general, it
takes over the investigating and statistical duties of the Bureau of
Corporations.
In so far as the field of general interstate trade is within the
practical range of supervision and regulation, the machinery here
adopted, it seems to me, is as effective as any could be. The ques-
tion whether the existing anti-trust law, with its twenty years of
construction by the Supreme Court, was not sufficient, and the
economic policy of adopting this close supervision and these in-
quisitorial methods in general business not charged with a public
use, it is not my purpose here to discuss. I am only now concerned
with the meaning of the new law and its effect upon the declara-
tion of substantive law in the anti-trust acts.
The first new term that confronts us in the Trade Commission
Act is "unfair methods of competition." What does it mean?
It does not appear in the Clayton Act at all, and yet the two a6ti_
are in pari materia.
It is hard to reach any other conclusion, after consideration of
the old legislation and the new, than that unfair methods of com-
petition thus denounced only include those methods and practices
in interstate trade the effect and intent of which would bring
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them within the scope and condemnation of the first, second, and
third sections of the Sherman Act. The same thing is true of
several specific offenses denounced in Secs. 2, 3, and 7 of the
Clayton Act. These are:
1. Discriminations in price as between purchasers in sales of
goods;
2. A sale or lease of goods patented or unpatented on condition
that the vendee shall not deal in or use the goods of a competitor;
3. Acquisition of stock by one trading corporation in another;
4. Acquisition of stock by one corporation in two other trading
corporations;
when the effect of any one of these four acts may be substantially
to lessen competition, restrain interstate commerce, or tend to
create monopoly.
The words "with the effect substantially to lessen competition"
are to be construed in the light of their association with the words
that follow them in order to secure some guide to the meaning
of " substantially." It certainly does not mean any lessening of
competition, however small, because its ordinary signification
prevents that. More than that, the union of two trading corpora-
tions by a holding company or otherwise must always lessen com-
petition somewhat. The only reasonable solution would seem
to be to hold that it means such substantial suppression of com-
petition as to constitute a real restraint of trade and a tendency
to monopolize. Now it is possible to point out decisions of the
Supreme Court on the anti-trust law in which each act here
specifically denounced is held to be within the Sherman law.
The condemnation of the so-called tying provision in the sale of
patented articles is the only one of the acts described that can
be regarded as a slight widening of the effect of that law. It may
lessen somewhat the scope of the legal monopoly under the patent
law as declared by the Supreme Court. With this small possible
exception, however, so far as I can see, the field of illegal and
criminal effort in respect to restraints of interstate commerce or
monopolies of it is not enlarged under the new acts. Indeed, it
is difficult to see how it could be, in view of the sweeping language
of Chief Justice White in construing the Sherman law in. the
HeinOnline  -- 37 Annu. Rep. A.B.A. 365 1914
ADDRESS OF T.IlE PRESIDENT.
Standard Oil and Tobacco cases. These three sections, therefore,
merely specify certain phases of violations of the Sherman law
which can be prosecuted under separate indictments.
In many other respects, these two new laws are only declaratory
of existing law. Thus one section of the Clayton Act provides
that if a corporation shall violate the law, any director, officer,
or agent authorizing such violation shall also be deemed guilty of
misdemeanor and punished by fine or imprisonment, or both.
This section is intended to carry out the famous policy, advanced
as a new departure, that guilt is personal. It is certainly a wise
provision, but it can hardly be called a new one, for it has always
been the law since there were crimes at the common law, and rules
punishing aiders and abettors. The section suggests that line of
Holmes to the "Katydid":
Thou sayest an undisputed thing in such a solemn way.
Such a provision cannot, of course, dispense with indictment
and trial of the director, officer, or agent, and will not prevent
the jury doing what it did in the Tobacco Trust case, when it
convicted the corporation and acquitted the president, who
was jointly indicted with the corporation, and who did the illegal
acts for which the corporation was convicted.
The analogy between the functions of the Commerce Commis-
sion and the Trade Commission is not complete. The considera-
tion of the question of unreasonableness and undue discrimina-
tion as to rates would seem to vest in the Commerce Commission
a much wider discretion and range of judgment, free from exami-
nation and review by the courts, than the Trade Commission has
in finding the facts and making the restraining order as to "un-
fair methods of competition." In the former case the Commerce
Commission is not only finding the facts, but is exercising in detail
the legislative function of Congress of rate regulation, which,
with general limitations, has to be delegated to the commission
in order that it can be effectively exercised at all. All that the
court does in review of action by the Commerce Commission is to
see that it is within the scope and limitations of the general dele-
gation of power, and that it does not deprive the carrier of his
property and its use without due process of the law, i. e., that it
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is not a confiscation. The function of the Trade Commission is
to find the facts also, but when it comes to decide the question of
unfair competition upon those facts, it would seem to be, as 1
have before said, only a question of law under the Sherman Act.
The Trade Commission, therefore, is merely to apply the law to
the facts as a Master in Chancery would do. This is to use the very
analogy by which the duties of the Trade Commission under
another section are described. So when the court comes to con-
sider the Trade Commission's action on review it takes its find-
ings and order and treats them as it would the report of a Master
in Chancery, with the exception that it cannot reexamine a find-
ing of fact unless there is no legal evidence to support it. It may
remand the case for additional evidence for further finding and
report. Proper equity practice requires that the Chancellor
should not set aside the finding of a Master on the facts unless
plainly contrary to the weight of the evidence. The difference
between this and treating the finding of fact as conclusive is, so
far as I can see, the only difference between the function of the
court in dealing with the Trade Commission's order and that
which it performs in dealing with the report of its Master in
Chancery as to the facts and the proper order or decree to be
entered upon them in an equity cause.
It is not germane to my purpose to discuss the effect of the pro-
hibition of interlocking directorates and the denunciation as fed-
eral crimes of breaches of trust of those having control of inter-
state commerce carriers, except to say that the inconvenience they
may cause to law-abiding business men of scrupulous honesty will
be much more than offset by the substantial good they will do in
protection of the public from illegal combinations and in the pro-
tection of confiding stockholders from being plundered.
In the last quarter of a century we have witnessed the enor-
mous growth of power in bodies of men, secured by the combina-
tions of capital on the one hand and of labor on the other. The
necessity for the combination of capital, in order to increase the
effectiveness of production and manufacture and to reduce its
cost, has been fully recognized by all persons at all familiar with
business conditions and eeonofic principles. The equal necessity
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for the combination of labor, in order to exact from capital its fair
share of the value of the joint product, consistent with the normal
operation of economic law, has also been recognized by sane
students of economic and social science. The enormous power
which these combinations have, has proved to be subject to great
abuses.
The combinations of capital too frequently strengthened their
control by the use of money in politics and through the instru-
mentality of the political boss and the machine. After the
country had sobered down from the intoxication of its enormous
business expansion and prosperity, the scales fell from the eyes
of the people, they saw the danger of plutocracy, and through-
out the length and breadth of the land they attempted, by
their representatives in the legislatures and in Congress, to
curb this power of combined capital and to restrain it within
legitimate limits, and so we had the interstate commerce law, the
anti-trust law, and the amendments to those laws, and the struggle
in the courts, until now both laws have received authoritative con-
struction and have become reasonably effective for the purpose for
which they were enacted.
But the momentum that such a popular movement acquires
prevents its stopping at the median line, and we are in danger
of excessive regulation which will really interfere with that free-
dom of trade and unrestricted initiative which has helped so
much the material progress of the country heretofore. Party
leaders and parties, in the imaginative and efflorescent style of
party platforms and stump deliverances, have denounced the
slow judicial process of remedying evils and establishing justice,
and have called for cross-cut methods, direct and summary reme-
dies, and the suppression of evil and the upholding of the good by
executive action in which those acting were not to be bothered by
precedent but were to decide everything upon the merits of the
particular case. Legislatures have sought to meet this demand by
creating commissions with large powers to enforce laws. In so far
as these commissions have rendered more effective the exercise of
what is really an executive function, they have been good things
and often they have relieved courts of quasi-executive duties that
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have not only burdened the courts, but also exposed them to
unnecessary prejudice and attack, because the matters acted on
had a political, economic, or social phase. Many have been dis-
posed to view this delegation of powers to commissions as dero-
gating from the authority of courts and as tending to deprive the
citizen of a real judicial hearing in defense of his right to liberty
and property and the pursuit of happiness. Whatever the early
effect, I do not think we need fear such an ultimate result. The
natural spirit engendered in every one who has blended with all
his conceptions of social and political life the principles of Anglo-
Saxon justice will prompt limitations in such legislative enact-
ments and in rules of practice for their execution, and preserve
the same due process of law for the party litigant that the barons
at Runnymede wrested from King John for the freemen of
England. The eminently judicial Court of Chancery was evolved
from the wide, unlimited, and apparently arbitrary discretion
that the King vested in his Chancellor to remedy individual in-
stances of injustice done by the King's own courts of common
law. The natural conservative tendency even of radical reformers
when confronted with the difficult duty of drafting- practical
legislation is well illustrated in the provisions of these two
statutes, which are far less drastic and revolutionary than we
had been led to expect when there was so much thundering in
the index.
While the abuses of combinations of capital have aroused
public alarm and evoked the most stringent laws to suppress
them, the abuses growing out of the enormous power of com-
binations of labor, which have been also manifest, have not evoked
the same regulative legislative tendency. Persons subjected to
illegal invasion of their rights by labor combinations have sought
to protect themselves in their business and property by invoking
the ordinary procedure in courts of justice; and in many instances
this has been effective. Litigation of this kind has not always re-
sulted in right decision. Courts are a human instrument, and
they sometimes err. A very few instances of error or injustice
against trades-unions have been a sufficient basis to arouse great
and disproportionate complaint and to bring to bear the most
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weighty political influence upon legislatures to pass laws to pre-
vent their recurrence, even if those laws are calculated to create a
special class of litigants and to render them immune from the
ordinary remedial process in court to which every other citizen is
subject.
Along with this there has been a strong movement, and a most
beneficial one, to give equality of opportunity to wage-earners in
their struggle for a livelihood and their pursuit of happiness, and
this movement has been greatly promoted by the direct efforts of
labor comlinations and their political influence. Without such
combinations, we may well doubt whether the present condition of
the wage-earner would be near so good as it is today. The
history of the common law shows beyond question that its princi-
ples were framed in the interest of the employer, and that in the
mutual relations of master and servant the servant was at a dis-
advantage. The power of combination among wage-earners,
which if not condemned was at least frowned upon at common law,
has created now an equality of resources in the inevitable and
continuing contest between employers and employees that has
greatly made for the improvement of the latter. The Interstate
Commerce Employers' Liability Act abolished the narrowing
and unfair fellow-servant rule of the federal jurisdiction. The
pending Workmen's Compensation Act, which proceeds on the
theory that society should bear the risks of the dangers of em-
ployment to the wage-earner, is a measure which, while it doubt-
less needs perfecting as it is tested by experience, is of the high-
est value from a social standpoint, and will, I believe, prove to
be of equal benefit from the business standpoint of the employer.
This act will ultimately, too, relieve the courts of a heavy volume
of litigation. The hours-of-labor statutes, child-labor statutes,
the tenement-housing statutes, the statutes requiring whole-
some surroundings for labor, are legislation paternal but useful.
In all these provisions for the benefit of the wage-earner,
however, there has been no special legislation looking to the
enforcement of his correspondent duty as a law-abiding citizen, or
to the effective restriction of the power of combined labor to
uominit abuses, as there has been against combinations of capital.
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This is not necessarily an unjust discrimination. The abuses
of one class of offenders against law and justice may be of such a
character as to require more elaborate machinery to prevent and
punish them than that of another, and in a certain sense this is
a true distinction between combined capital and combined labor.
The control of capital is concentrated in the hands of compara-
tively few. That is what the combination of capital necessarily in-
volves. The capital and profits may and do belong to a very large
number, but the real improvement in business methods has come
from the amassing of the earnings of the many into funds which,
by the genius of the comparatively few managers, are made vastly
more productive than if they remained for the separate invest-
ment and control of each owner. Such managers, when they
wish to resort to abuses of their power, can hide the truth and
clothe their proceedings with a cloak that makes the discovery
of illegal method and its punishment difficult. With the com-
binations of labor it is somewhat different. The co-operation
of great numbers is essential when they resort to methods of
oppression and tyranny, and their lawlessness is generally the
lawlessness of the assault and crimes of open violence, for the
punishment of which the usual statute of crimes and misde-
meanors and the ordinary machinery for the enforcement of such
laws should be sufficient. The ineffectiveness of the machinery
in such cases is not due to inadequacy of the law so much as to
the inertia or political timidity of the officers of the law or the
prejudice of voters and juries growing out of sympathy with the
cause, in supposed furtherance of which, such offenses are com-
mitted.
The great political power that labor combinations are believed
to exercise has enabled them successfully to press upon legisla-
tures the idea that they are politically a privileged class, that the
interest of the community lies in making them so, and that their
cause is so important that the ordinary means of enforcing the law
against their violations of it should be weakened rather than
strengthened. To yield to this view it seems to me is unwise.
Between the machinations of the lawless manipulator of capital
and the aggressions of the lawless leader or agents of combined
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labor, there is a forgotten man, sometimes described as the "pub-
lic," for whom government and society chiefly exist, who in the
clashes between capital and labor finds himself ground between
the upper and the nether millstone.
We must recognize, however, that the movement to make com-
binations of labor a privileged class before the law has had con-
siderable success. In England the legalizing of secondary or
compound boycotts in a trade dispute by wage-earners is com-
plete even against unconcerned outsiders. In our last Sundry
Civil Bill, Congress has expressly limited the use of the money
specifically appropriated for the Department of Justice to enforce
the anti-trust law so that it cannot be used in prosecutions of
wage-earners and farmers charged with its violation. Farmers
were here included not because they asked it, but in order to enlist
their political aid in maintaining the exemption. In some of the
states, laws have been passed to permit wage-earners and farmers
to do things which are illegal when done by others. During the
current year the Massachusetts Legislature has passed a law limit-
ing injunctions in labor disputes which is nearly as radical as
the English statute, and which seems to me to go much further
than the limitations of the Clayton Act. One feels in respect to
such an enactment by the conservative, law-abiding Old Bay
State, which loves equality and properly prides itself as a govern-
ment of laws' and not men, as the author of the Biglow Papers did
with reference to her attitude in the Mexican War, when he Said:
Massachusetts, God forgive her, is a-kneelin' with the rest.
We are living in an age of what I may call factionalism, an
age in which classes are disposed to think that the happiness
of each class is more important than the general sum of hap-
piness of the entire community, and that the members of
each class, denied 'what they wish, may properly violate the law,
destroy property and even lives in order to secure it. Such a spirit
is dangerous. It is an evidence of a lack of that self-restraint with-
out which the bonds of society will necessarily be loosed. We see
it in the wild ravings and action of the militant suffragettes in
England. We see it in the resistance to lawful authority in Idaho
and Colorado by the Western Federation of Miners. We see it in
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the dynamite plots of the bridge workers and the iron workers at
Los Angeles and at Indianapolis. We see it in opposition to fed-
eral legislation to protect aliens' treaty rights. Such a spirit flouts
the law, does not regard order and peace as essential to social and
political happiness, but exalts the supreme selfishness of a class
and is willing to pull down the structures of society in order to
secure the granting of its particular demands. The struggle to
put legislation of the kind I have mentioned on the national
statute book has been long and earnest. And now those who have
led in the movement claim to have accomplished their purpose in
the legislation of the sitting Congress which I am now examining.
Let us see how far they have been successful.
Section 6 of the Clayton Act reads as follows:
"That the labor of a human being is not a commodity or ar-
ticle of commerce. Nothing contained in the anti-trust laws
shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor,
agricultural, or horticultural organizations instituted for the
purposes of mutual help and not having capital stock or conducted
for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual members of such
organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects
thereof, nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be
held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in
restraint of trade -under anti-trust laws."
There is language in this section, especially the last clause,
which, standing alone and without explanation, might seem to
show congressional intention to exempt such associations and
their members altogether from the operation of the anti-trust
acts. But such is evidently not the proper construction. The
representatives of organized labor applied to Congress for this
provision, on the ground that they were afraid that voluntary
associations for increasing wages and bettering terms of employ-
inent, where the employment was in interstate commerce, might
he considered, per se, illegal restraints of that commerce and so
subject them to dissolution. They, therefore, wished them de-
clared legal. That it was not intended to make members of such
associations a privileged class and free from the operation of
general laws is clearly shown by the careful language of Congress,
which authorizes the existence and operation of such association.
and forbids the restraint of their members when "lawfully carry-
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ing out the legitimate objects thereof." The words following,
"nor shall such organizations or the members thereof be held or
construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint
of trade under the anti-trust laws," which are introduced by a
semicolon and the conjunction "nor," necessarily carry forward
in the word "such" the same condition of the exemption, to wit,
that the corporations and the members shall be "lawfully carry-
ing out the legitimate objects thereof." Courts would naturally
and properly indulge the presumption against a class privilege
based on membership in such voluntary organizations, unless the
purpose of Congress to confer it were clear. When, however,
there is here express language expressly rebutting such a purpose,
the intention of Congress becomes manifest to make this Sec. 6
a mere declaratory statement of existing law in order to remove
the unfounded fears of those petitioning for such a statement.
The procedure prescribed in Secs. 17, 18, and 19 of the Clayton
Act as to the issuing of preliminary restraining orders without
notice and of preliminary injunctions in federal courts is ad-
mirable. It is in accordance with the best equity practice and will
doubtless tend to prevent any ill-advised orders without notice and
hearing.
Sec. 20 of the Clayton Act is the principal section of the act
for the limitation of injunctive relief in labor disputes. It forbids
the issuing of restraining orders and injunctions in all cases:
1. Between an employer and employees;
"2. Between employers and employees;
3. Between employees;
"4. Between persons employed and those seeking employment;
"when it involves or grows out of a dispute concerning terms
or conditions of employment unless it is necessary to prevent ir-
reparable injury to property or to a property right for which there
is no adequate remedy at law; and such property or property right
must be described with particularity.
"And no such restraining order is to prohibit any person or
persons from:
" . Terminating any relation of employment;
" 2. Ceasing to perform any work or labor;
" 3. Recommending, advising, or persuading others by peaceful
means so to do;
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"4. Attending at any place where any such person may law-
fully be for the purpose of peacefully obtaining or connunicating
information;
5. From peacefully persuading any person to work or to ab-
stain from working;
6. From ceasing to patronize or to employ any party to such
dispute;
7. From recommending, advising, or persuading others by
peaceful and lawful means so to do;
"8. From paying or giving to or withholding from any person
engaged in such dispute any strike benefits or other moneys or
things of value;
9. From peaceably assembling in a lawful manner and for
lawful purposes;
10. From doing any act or thing which might lawfully be
done in the absence of dispute by any party thereto.
" And none of such acts shall be held to be violations of any
law of the United States."
The limitation in this act in terms affects injunctions in equity
and not suits at law, but the acts which it forbids the courts to
restrain they are also forbidden to treat as violations of any law
of the United States. How far this would prevent a suit at law
based on diverse citizenship in the federal court for injury from
an act like one described in the section not affecting interstate
trade is a question I have not time to discuss.
The section introduces an exception to the power of a federal
court of equity to give injunctive relief under general prin-
ciples of equity jurisprudence. The field of that exception is
hedged about with limitations of a threefold character. Those
who rely on the exception must bring themselves within all three
limitations in order to take advantage of its exemption and privi-
lege.
The first limitation is as to the character of the parties to the
suit, which must be between employers and employees, between
employees, or between employed and those seeking employ-
ment. This, of course, leaves the law as it is in suits brought by
those who are not employers or employees or seeking employment
against belligerents in a labor war for illegal injuries inflicted.
Federal courts may, therefore, still, on the prayer of an out-
sider, enjoin a boycott against him to compel him to take
part in the fight with which he has no concern. Thus the for-
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gotten man who has no part in the fight is remembered and may
still appeal to a court of equity as a neutral to be saved from the
aggressions or coercion of either contestant.
The second limitation upon this exception is in the subject-
matter of the action. To establish the exemption or privilege,
the issue must be a dispute concerning terms or conditions of
employment. This, too, excludes from the exception an injunc-
tion in favor of a third person not a party to the labor fight, who
is sought to be drawn into it by boycott. Then further to justify
the exemption, the irreparable injury complained of, for which
there is no adequate remedy at law, must not be to property
or to a property right of the employer or employee engaged in th
labor dispute. Of course, the requirement that the injury shall be
irreparable and one for which damages at law would be an in-
adequate remedy, is only declaratory of general equity practice.
We come then to the question what the phrase "injury
to property or to a property right" includes. In the bills pre-
sented by the labor organizations and in some legislation in the
states such words have been followed by a proviso that injury to
business of a plaintiff shall not be considered an injury "to prop-
erty or a property right." The failure of Congress to add this
proviso, though urged to do so, must be regarded as significant,
and would seem to imply that it was the congressional intention to
leave to the court to decide whether injury to a man's business of
an irreparable character was not an injury to a property right. It
would certainly be an injury to the good-will of such business.
This, under the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States, is a thing of money value ificident to tangible property
and peculiarly within equitable protection by injunction.
The third limitation of the exception is in the definition of acts
that may not be enjoined in such cases as fulfill the previous
requirements. These acts in controversies between employer and
employees and between employers and between striking employees
and those seeking employment have with one or two exceptions
been held to be lawful, and are thus merely declaratory of existing
law. No court has held that an employer could have an injunction
against men leaving his employment, or ceasing to patronize him,
or against picketing by strikers where it takes the peaceful form
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described in the section. The general inhibition against injunc-
tions forbidding an act which might be lawfully done in the
absence of the dispute is also only a statement of the law as it
always has been. An act mentioned in the statute which has some-
times been held to be restrainable in equity has been that of per-
suading others, i. e., outsiders, from ceasing to patronize or em-
ploy the opponent in such a dispute. This seems to legalize not
only the secondary boycott, so far as it is carried on by peaceful
persuasion, but also the blacklist. I fear this will leave some cruel
injuries without a remedy. The withholding of strike benefits or
other things of value from deserters and the paying of them to
recruits may be a modification of the existing rule as held by some
courts, but not, I think, in the best-reasoned cases.
This Sec. 20, except for its studied apparent amnbiguity in it,
,se of the term "property or property right," seems to have tw
merit of laying down a broad practical distinction between what.
is allowed in a labor fight and what is not. It segregates the
parties to the controversy from the rest of the community an,1
says in effect that acts committed singly or in concert by the
parties on either side against the other which do not amount to
violence or crime or a threat of either, and which do not involve
peaceful moral coercion of outsiders, are legal in the trade war-
fare and shall not be enjoined. Recommendation and persuasioil
of others to help either side in the warfare are declared to be legal,
but not so moral coercion. The real and great danger from boy-
cotts in such disputes is the use of them to drag into trade dis-
putes against their will all classes of the community not normally
related to the issue. It is the embarrassment and injury they
would thus infliet upon the forgotten man, the entity called the
"public," that creates the illegality. This was actionable before
the new statute and remains so. Sec. 20 does not legalize it. In
Sec.-7 it only forbids injunctions against "persuading others
[i. e., outsiders] by pjeaceful and lawful means" to cease to
patronize or employ any parties to such disputes. It therefore
follows that, in spite of See. 20, parties to a labor dispute on one
side may have an injunction against the parties on the other side
to prevent the latter from using as a weapon in the fight such a
boycott of outsiders.
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Mr. Justice Lamar, speaking for the court in the Bucks Stove
case (221 U. S. 437), said:
" Courts differ as to what constitutes a boycott that mhy be
_enjoined. All hold that there must be a conspiracy causing irrep-
arable damage to business or property of the complainant. Some
hold that a boycott against the complainant by a combination not
immediately connected with him in business can be restrained.
Others hold that the secondary boycott can be enjoined where the
conspiracy extends not only to injuring the complainants but, sec-
ondarily, coerces or attempts to coerce his customers to refrain
from dealing with him by threats that unless they do they them-
selves will be boycotted. Others hold that no boycott can be en-
joined unless there are acts of physical violence or intimidation
ca used by threats of physical violence."
In the case of Loewe vs. Lawler- (208 U. S. 274) the Supreme
Court took its position with courts in the second class, described
by Mr. Justice Lamar, which I have italicized. The effect of
that case is stated by the court in Eastern Association vs. United
States (234 U. S. 600), as follows:
"In Loewe vs. Lawler (208 U. S. 274) this court held that a
combination to boycott the hats of a manufacturer and deter
dealers from buying them in order to coerce the manufacturer to
a particular course of action with reference to labor organizations,
the effect of the combination being to compel third parties and
strangers not to engage in a course of trade except upon condi-
tions which the combination imposed, was within the Sherman
Act."
It follows that the new statute does not affect Loewe vs. Lawler
at all.
The remaining provisions of the act, in Sees. 21 to 25, inclusive,
prescribe the procedure in certain cases of contempt of the judg-
ments, orders, and decrees of a federal court. They apply only to
cases where the act of disobedience is an offense against the crim-
inal laws of the United States. or of the state wherein it is com-
mitted, and not then when it is committed in the presence of
the court or so near thereto as to interfere with the administration
of justice, or when the suit is one brought by the United'States.
Its chief feature is contained in the following words:
"In all cases within the purview of this act such trial may be
by the court or, upon demand of the accused, by a jury, in which
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latter event the court may impanel a jury from the jurors then in
attendance on the court, or the judge thereof in chambers may
cause a sufficient number of jurors to be selected and summoned,
as provided by law, to attend at the time and place of trial, at
which time a jury shall be selected and impaneled as upon a trial
for a misdemeanor."
Opportunity for review of judgments of conviction in such
cases is given.
It has been contended that the use of the word "may " leaves
the question of ordering a jury in such a case to the discretion of
the court. I agree that the expression is unfortuilately ambigu-
ous and that it would have been greatly better to have used the
stronger word, if it was intended to make the provision as to a
jury mandatory. It enables those who contend that discretion to
refuse a jury trial is still vested in the court to argue that this
provision, like so much of the rest of this legislation, was merely
intended to be declaratory of what was already the best equity
practice. Still it should be said in answer that "may" often is
construed to mean "must" or " shall," and I think it should be
so construed here. The use of the words "upon demand of the
accused" rebuts the idea that he is asking something which the
court in its discretion may withhold. Moreover Sec. 24 of the act
indicates that it was intended by this procedure to change exist-
ing equity procedure, because it specifically provides that all other
cases of contempt not affected by this language "may be punished
iii conformity to the usages of law and equity now prevailing."
The procedure by jury and appellate review in eontempts is
thus limited to a narrow class of cases. Were Debs to do the
things he did in 1894, his contempt would not come within this
statute for the order he disobeyed was made in a suit by the United
States. He could still be tried without a jury, therefore, and sen-
tenced to six months in jail for contempt of a restraining order of
the federal court without direct review or repeal. In the great
body of litigation by private persons, in which the disobedience of
a judgment, order, or decree is not a crime or misdemeanor under
state or federal law, the power of the courts to maintain their
authority and enforce their judgments is also unaffected. In
times past we heard much in party platforms and in stump
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oratory of government by injunction and the outrage of hav-
ing courts formulate offenses that were not crimes by statute
and then punish the committing of them without a jury. Those
of us who never thought that this was anything but buncombe
seem to be vindicated by the failure of the present statute to
remedy this much-heralded and so-called abuse of judicial power.
All these provisions have been called the charter of liberty of
labor. We have seen that the changes from existing law they
make are not broadly radical and that most of them are declara-
tory merely ofrwhat would be law without the statute. This is a
useful statute in definitely regulating procedure in injunctions
and in express definition of what may be done in labor disputes.
But what I fear is that when the statute is construed by the courts
it will keep the promise of the labor leaders to the ear and break
it to the hope of the ranks of labor. This will be an additional
reason for blaming and attacking the courts. It is really a shift-
ing of responsibility from Congress to the judicial branch of the
government that has had to bear so many of such burdens con-
ceived in political timidity of legislators. However this may be,
[ think we should be profoundly grateful that the impairment of
the authority of our federal courts has been but small when com-
pared with the very drastic and dangerous changes which were
pressed and proclaimed as certain.
This Association four years ago appointed a Special Committee
to Oppose the Judicial Recall, and that committee has done
great work. Its present chairman, Mr. Rome G. Brown, of
the Minneapolis Bar, has delivered effective addresses to many
State Bar Associations throughout the country, and has en-
couraged legislative opposition in many states to the embodiment
of these heresies in statutes. The report of the committee shows
that there has been a distinct falling off in the support of these
fundamentally unwise and dangerous proposals. They were in-
corporated in the platform of the Progressive party, and the leader
of that party has felt called upon to declare that they were the rock
upon which it was founded, and were essential to the efficacy of
every other one of the reforms which the platform of the party
set forth and advocated. It would appear that the party which
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fathered these proposals now finds that instead of being the rock
on which it is founded, it is, to change the metaphor, the rock on
which it founders. Certainly it seems wise to its leaders to ignore
this part of their original propaganda which indicates that it has
ceased to be vote-getting and, indeed, has become a burden to any
party that assumes to press it. I do not mean to say that the de-
nunciation of the courts has not continued to be a favorite theme
in the mouths of a certain class of orators, but the originators of
this preposterous nostrum of recall of decisions are engaged iii
scaling it down into changes in our judicial system which are nut
to be commended but which are much less radical and objec-
tionable. In New York the Progressive party has abandoned its
platform altogether and confined its appeal'to the voters to a
declaration against boss rule, while its candidate for Governor
has rejected the recall. In Massachusetts, too, such methods of'
reforming the judiciary are not made the subject of discussion at
all by the Progressive party, and its evident effort is to induce the
voters to ignore them. The demon rum has there been substituted
as the object of attack, instead of "the divine right of fossilized
judges," and of this change, whatever our views of prohibition,
we can express our unqualified approval. The only state iii
which the recall of judicial decisions has been adopted is the State
of Colorado, and the present condition of that state with reference
to governmental authority is not such as to commend those who
have formulated its policies in the recent past.
[ regret to say that the earnest efforts of Mr. Shelton and his
Committee on Uniform Procedure to secure the passage of a bill
entrusting the Supreme Court with the power to make rules for
the procedure in common law cases in the federal court have not
thus far been successful. The Judiciary Committee of the House
reported the bill favorably, as it has nearly all of the American
Bar Association bills. But the pressure upon Congress for other
measures, thought by the leaders to be more important, has pre-
vented the passage of the bill. Of course we must not be discour-
aged by this delay. We must continue to urge the reform. With
deference to a different opinion of many in this Association, my
own judgment about the Shelton Bill is that it is not quite radical
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enough. I think it ought to provide that all suits in the federal
court should be brought in one form of civil action, thus uniting
cases in law and equity, and that then the Supreme Court should
be authorized and directed to provide a simple procedure by rules
of court, in analogy to the method that now prevails in the High
Court of Justice in England.
I am aware, of course, that there is clanguage in the decisions of
the Supreme Court of the United States from which many have
inferred that such an act as I propose would be contrary to the
Constitution. The terms in which the judicial power is extended
to the United States to include all cases in law and equity arising
under the Constitution and laws of the United States, and the
Seventh Amendment prescribing a jury trial in all suits at com-
mon law involving more than $20 and forbidding any reexami-
nation of the verdict of the jury except according to the rules
of the common law, are supposed to fix forever upon federal
courts an antiquated procedure. But no case has ever been de-
cided by the Supreme Court in which this point is adjudged.
Every case which has arisen has been under statutes of the United
States which have expressly established two separate courts, one of
equity and one of law.
The requirement that in suits at common law a jury trial must
be had and that its result shall be reexamined only according to
common law usage has recently been considered by the Supreme
Court in passing on the validity of a practice intended to ex-
pedite procedure. Slocum vs. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U. S.
364. 1 regret to say that the majority of the court took what
with deference would have seemed to me before the decision a
somewhat technical view of that amendment. The argument of
the minority of Justices appeals strongly to the enthusiast for
simplification of procedure.
But there is nothing in the Slocum case which holds that we
may not have under the Federal Constitution a union of a suit
at law and an equitable defense in one form of action. Such
a union would not in any way destroy the rights or opportunities
of the parties to have the common law remedy of trial by jury and
its restricted review where the issue of fact is of such a nature that
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a jury would be required in a suit at common law. We are not
limited in the establishment of this proposition to mere theo-
retical statement or reasoning. Every code state since the Field
Code was made the law in New York, has shown by actual experi-
ence the possibility of uniting in one form of action all the cases
arising in law and equity between litigants without impairing
the right of jury trial at common law and without creating the
slightest confusion. No litigant has a vested right in mere delay
in procedure. It does not prejudice the plaintiff in the suit at law
who is seeking to try his issue before a jury that his opponent by
pleading his equitable defense and varying the issues is able
to defeat his purpose in the same case instead of incurring the
delay and expense of securing an injunction to stay the case at
law and making the equitable issue in another court.
I do not intend to take up your time to-day in a detailed discus-
sion of the best methods of reforming judicial procedure, but there
is one means of facilitating the dispatch of business in courts of
justice that might well be applied in our federal courts. We have
in our federal system 32 circuit judges and 94 district judges..
The district judges are apportioned, one, two, or three, or even
more, to a state with its judicial districts, and the states make
up the nine circuits. Originally the district judges and the
circuit judges of each circuit could be used to help along the
business in all the districts of that circuit, and in the business of
its Court of Appeals. Now the Chief Justice can send district
judges in a limited class of cases from one circuit to another
circuit. This system works well so far as it has been applied,
but I think a much greater advantage could be derived from it
if it were amplified to its logical development. Now that litiga-
tion has increased in parts of the country so that its mass is
overwhelming, we must approach the problems of its disposition
in the same way that the head of a great industrial establish-
ment approaches the question of the manufacture of the amount
that he will need, to meet the demand for the goods which he
makes. This is done by estimate of the work to be done and an
assignment each year of a competent force to do it. In other
words, the time has come to introduce into the dispatch of judicial
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work something of the executive method that great expansion
has forced in other fields of human activity.
In the judicial business of the United States we should devise
a system by which the whole judicial force of circuit and district
judges could be distributed to dispose of the entire mass of busi-
ness promptly. Some judges have too much and a greater number
could do more. Let us equalize their burdens and give them a
maximum of effectiveness. It seems to me that either the Su-
preme Court or the Chief Justice should be given an adequate
executive force of competent subordinates to keep close and
current watch upon the business awaiting dispatch in all the
districts and circuits of the United States, and likely to arise
during the ensuing year, to make periodical estimate of the num-
ber of judges needed in the various districts to dispose of such
business, and to assign the adequate number of judges to the dis-
tricts where needed. Then the Supreme Court by making the
rules of procedure and by distributing the judicial force could
greatly facilitate the proper disposition of all the legal business
in the country and in a sense become responsible for its dispatch.
If .it is found that there are not judges enough, then we should
hear from the Supreme Court as a competent authority, not in-
fluenced by political or personal considerations, how many judges
are needed and where, and the judicial force could be increased
to meet the real exigency. On a small scale this system has been
worked in the Municipal Court in Chicago and in some other
municipal courts, and the possibility of thus getting rid of an
enormous mass of litigation has been demonstrated.
Of course, it will be said that this is imposing a great burden
on a court that is already weighed down with too much work.
1. do not ignore the justice of this criticism, but it can certainly
ie partially, or perhaps wholly, met by taking away from the
Supreme Court all questions which do not involve, as a genuine
issue, the construction of the Constitution, and by limiting the
duty of the court to hear any other cases to those which upon a
writ of certiorari the court in its discretion draws to its jurisdic-
tion.
The agitation with reference to the courts, the general attacks
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upon them, the grotesque remedies proposed of recall of judges
and recall of judicial decisions, and the resort of demagogues to
the unpopularity of courts as a means of promoting their own
political fortunes, all impose upon us, members of the Bar and
upon judges of the courts and legislatures, the duty to remove, as
far as possible, grounds for just criticism of our judicial system.
Tfle federal system extends into every state. It is under the con-
trol of one legislature and subordinate to one Supreme Court.
Here is the opportunity to furnish to the country a model which
shall inspire state legislatures and state Supreme Courts to simi-
lar efforts to make their courts the handmaid of prompt justice.
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